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1.  Introduction 
The legal regulation of property and money within intimate couple 
relationships is subject to the frequent challenges posed by changing social 
norms.  Family law has long been charged with resolving the disputes which 
the mixing of sex and money tend to provoke especially when relationships 
break down.  However across the western world in recent times it has been 
trying to shake free from its patriarchal roots and react appropriately to the 
move away from marriage-centred and gender stereo-typed roles for men and 
women within families.  A parallel development is its acceptance of same-sex 
relationships as a family form within our society.  The conflicting themes within 
these debates are gender equality (e.g. Deech, 1996, Diduck and Orton, 
1994), the protective function of family law (e.g. Maclean and Eekelaar 1997, 
Fineman, 1995) and the right to make autonomous choices (e.g. Freeman, 
1984).  These are explored below in the context of family law’s search for the 
best way to regulate couples, their money and their property in England and 
Wales and whether there are lessons to be learned from Europe. 
Let us first outline the legal and demographic context to the regulation of 
couple finances in Europe.  Broadly speaking, Western Europe is 
experiencing a decline in marriage and rises in divorce, heterosexual 
cohabitation and births outside marriage (see e.g. Kiernan, 2004) yet legal 
regulation remains marriage-centred.  At the same time, most West European 
states now recognise same-sex couples who, depending on the jurisdiction, 
can either marry and/or enter into registered partnerships giving them the 
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same or similar rights as married couples (see Boele-Woelki and Fuchs, 
2003, Curry-Sumner, 2005).  A minority of European states also allow 
heterosexual couples to register civil partnerships.  Regulation of money and 
property within couple relationships tends to be concentrated on married and 
registered relationships in European jurisdictions.  Informal cohabitation has 
nowhere in Europe achieved the presumptive marriage-equivalence found in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand1 although as explored below, English2 
law has adopted this presumptive and protective approach in some legal 
contexts but not, confusingly, in others.   
In contrast to its European neighbours, in England and Wales marriage or 
registering a same-sex civil partnership has no direct effect on a couple’s 
property which continues to be owned separately unless specifically 
purchased jointly.  At the point of divorce (or civil partnership dissolution) 
though, the court has wide discretionary powers to redistribute income and 
capital assets to achieve a fair outcome between the parties.  The rationale 
for this is to protect the weaker economic family members – typically women 
and children – and balance non-financial contributions to family life against 
financial contributions when things go wrong.  In all European Union states 
other than the common law jurisdictions of the UK, Ireland and Malta, 
marriage and civil partnership registration do have an automatic effect on the 
property rights of the couple unless they opt out of the default community of 
property regime imposed by law.  However, the wide variety of ‘community of 
property’ regimes within Europe together with the very different common law 
approach has led to consideration of harmonisation of family law including the 
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possibility of a generic European community of property regime by the 
European Commission (see McGlynn, 2001, European Commission, 2006). 
By way of contrast, the position of informal cohabiting couples has yet to be 
addressed at a European level despite the demographic drift away from 
marriage and into cohabitation.  In Britain, though, this is a matter of live 
debate and one which is heightened by the fact that research has shown that 
many cohabiting couples falsely believe they have the same legal rights as 
married couples – the so-called ‘common law marriage myth’ (Barlow et al, 
2001, 2005, Barlow, 2002).  Legal reform has this year been enacted in 
Scotland (see Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006) and is currently under 
consideration by the Law Commission for England and Wales (the Law 
Commission) (see Law Commission, 2006). 
So is community of property an attractive option in England and Wales in 
regulating the property of married and/or cohabiting couples?  Or is it now 
outmoded and not suited to the diversity of 21st century family structures?  
Can family law in Britain in general and Europe in particular continue to 
restrict its regulation to married and registered partners ignoring the growing 
number of couples who partner and parent outside marriage or formally 
registered partnerships?   
Drawing on data from an empirical study focusing on the law in England and 
Wales, France, The Netherlands and Sweden (Cooke et al, 2006), this article 
will compare the advantages and disadvantages of different legal approaches 
and help assess the need for legal reform within the European Union context.  
Let us begin with some legal history. 
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2.  Separate Property versus Community of Property – An Historical 
Perspective 
Marriage has always been an economic as well as an emotional relationship 
often combined with the upbringing of children.  When wives were the chattels 
of their husbands, all their property and income became owned by their 
husbands on marriage under the doctrine of unity of husband and wife 
(Cretney, 2003, 91).  Legislative reform when it came in England and Wales in 
the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 opted to allow married 
women to own their property as separate property.  This allowed them to 
retain control over their own income and capital assets and become liable for 
their own debts to the extent of their separate property (see Cretney, 2003, 
99).  Given that most married women at this time did not earn or have their 
own income, had few assets and were financially dependant on their 
husbands this was a reform brought about with the interests of the middle and 
upper class women at the forefront of the battle for women’s equality in mind.   
In contrast, the nineteenth century approach in European jurisdictions such as 
France and The Netherlands was rather to create a default matrimonial 
regime which imposed on marriage an ‘immediate community of property’.  
Indeed both jurisdictions still retain this model of immediate community which 
automatically applies unless the parties contract differently.3  Put simply, this 
means that all of the husband and wife’s separately-owned property (in the 
case of The Netherlands) or at least some of it (as is the case in France 
where only post-marriage acquired assets excluding inherited or gifted 
property are affected) as well as their post-marriage debts become jointly 
owned during the marriage and can only be dealt with by them acting 
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together.  Both during and at the end of the marriage, unless specifically 
agreed otherwise, each spouse would be credited with an equal share in the 
community assets.  This system has certainly been seen by some as better 
recognising the realities of the economic relationship within most marriages 
and as offering greater financial protection for the weaker economic spouse, 
most often the wife.  Writing in the 1950s, Kahn-Freund, a German legal 
academic working in England, saw the married family as an economic entity 
with funds of money and property dedicated to common use.  He expressed 
his concern with the English stance –  
The fact that they are husband and wife has no effect on their property.  
Nothing is by law ‘theirs’; everything…is in the absence to the contrary, 
either ‘his’ or ‘hers’.  Sociologists must decide whether this rule reflects 
the mores and the ideas of the people.’ (Kahn-Freund, 1952, 133) 
In consequence it was unimaginable in his eyes for the law to ignore the 
effects of marriage on the property of the spouses and confine itself, as it did 
in England, to a system of separate property.  Yet by this time the 
emancipation of women had prompted some community of property 
jurisdictions to modify their default matrimonial regimes to allow separate 
ownership of property during marriage but impose a community regime 
requiring an equal division of community assets between the spouses on 
divorce (e.g. Swedish Marriage Code 1920).  This concept is known as 
‘deferred community of property’ and is a system which aims to strike a good 
balance between autonomy of the spouses during the marriage and protection 
for the weaker economic spouse at the end.  It is a model now widely used 
throughout Scandinavia (see Martiny, 2004, Boel-Woelki et al, 2000). 
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In community of property jurisdictions, the matrimonial property regime also 
governs the divorce settlement of capital assets, with divorce law intervening 
only to provide maintenance for the weaker economic spouse (in addition to 
child support) and perhaps a right for them to remain with the children in 
occupation of the matrimonial home for a short period of time.  The courts 
have little discretion and despite their protective aims, community regimes can 
in practice still operate harshly at the point of divorce, especially for the 
weaker economic spouse.  Despite the ability to contract out of the default 
matrimonial regimes and to vary the regime according to changing 
circumstances, only a minority of couples (principally those with independent 
means or the self-employed with large business debt) actually seek legal 
advice and do so (Barlow et al, 2003, Cooke et al, 2005). However, divorcing 
dependant wives traditionally fared worse under the separate property system 
which offered them little protection and proposals for a liberalised divorce law 
provoked loud calls for matrimonial property reform in England and Wales in 
the latter half of the twentieth century.   
 
3.  Maintenance, separate property and divorce - the English perspective 
Until 1970, divorce law in England and Wales only allowed claims by wives for 
periodical maintenance (alimony), with each spouse retaining their own 
separate property.  No transfer of capital or assets was possible on divorce 
other than by agreement, no matter how deserving the case.  When divorce 
was rare and rented homes were the norm and readily available, arguably this 
could be justified.  However rises in divorce, owner-occupation, property 
prices and shortages of rented accommodation in the second half of the 
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twentieth century brought the harsh effects of the doctrine of separate 
property into the political limelight (see further Cretney, 2003, 118 et seq).  As 
Professor McGregor summarised it in a Parliamentary debate in 1979, it had 
unintentionally institutionalised inequality in the economic relations of 
husbands and wives.  By preventing husbands getting their hands on their 
wives’ money, the statute denied wives rights in their husbands’ money.  And 
in the real world it was mostly husbands who had the money.4 
Between 1956 and 1979 the introduction of a system of community of 
property or at least of statutory co-ownership of the matrimonial home in 
England had some powerful supporters, although in the event neither was to 
materialise.  Rather than interfere with separate property rights within 
marriage, English law came to adopt a system of discretionary redistribution 
of assets as well as income according to a list of statutory criteria which it still 
retains today (see now Part II Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s25).  Ironically, 
it is the flexible discretionary nature of financial provision on divorce making 
outcomes uncertain and often inconsistent which has become the focus of the 
problems discussed in relation to financial provision on divorce in England; a 
problem which the courts rather than Parliament have been attempting to 
address (see e.g. Eekelaar, 1998). 
In property terms, limited reform granting a spouse a statutory right of 
occupation of the matrimonial home and the right for a wife to own 
housekeeping money equally with her husband were enacted (see 
Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 and Married Women’s Property Act 1964 
respectively).  Later there was further pressure from the Church of England 
who took the view that ‘the establishment of community of property in some 
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form would do much to prevent injustice’ if divorce laws were to be liberalised 
(Archbishop of Canterbury’s Group, 1966, para. 64).  In fact the Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act 1970 implementing quite minor 
recommendations made by the Law Commission (Law Commission, 1969), 
only extended the discretionary financial orders a court could make on 
divorce, although critically for women did provide for ‘contributions to the 
welfare of the family’ to be considered.  It did not reform family property law 
which was still under consideration by the Commission and thus judicial 
discretion was established over family property at the point of divorce at the 
expense of spousal property rights.  Yet it was property rights which as the 
Law Commission’s Working Paper records women had demanded ‘not 
possible discretionary benefits’ (Law Com 1971, para. 0.22).   
Nonetheless, the Law Commission chose in the end to reject community of 
property, recommending instead a reinforcement of the court’s existing 
discretionary powers on divorce combined with the introduction of a system of 
statutory co-ownership of the matrimonial home for spouses (Law 
Commission, 1978).  In an era when marriage for life was the social norm and 
most matrimonial homes were still purchased in the sole name of the 
husband, for wives to automatically become co-owners of the family home, 
thereby giving them real property rights, was seen as an important protection 
both during the marriage itself as well on divorce.  However even this more 
limited vision of a restricted form of community proved to be a step too far.5  
Indeed the financial plight of divorced men rather than divorced women 
became the political issue and whereas the Matrimonial Homes Bill 1979 
containing the statutory co-ownership proposals fell at the general election, 
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the new Conservative administration was swift to introduce reform restricting a 
wife’s right to life-long maintenance (Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1984).  By this stage, it had become common practice for husbands and 
wives to purchase the matrimonial home in their joint names and the 
community of property debate had become a dead letter. 
Thus both community of property systems and the English separate property 
system have tried to adjust to the changing position of married women (and 
men) within society.  Both claim to have replaced patriarchy with formal 
equality in the financial frameworks governing marriage and divorce.  So 
confident are they of this, that they have now almost all extended their 
matrimonial financial provision regimes to same-sex couples and some (for 
example, Sweden and Scotland) have extended a less extensive version to 
informally cohabiting couples.  Let us now consider how the current law in the 
studied jurisdictions of England and Wales, France, The Netherlands and 
Sweden regulates couple finances and then consider whether European 
harmonisation is desirable. 
4. Regulating Couple Finances – A Summary of the Current Law in 
England and Wales6 
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 which came into force in December 2005 has 
in effect imposed the legal consequences of marriage upon those registering 
their civil partnership under the terms of the Act.  However only same-sex 
couples can register a partnership and only heterosexual couples can marry.  
Outside these formalised relationships there remains a growing band of 
informal cohabitants both same- and different-sex in respect of whom the law 
metes out different treatment in different contexts (see Table 1).  However, a 
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recent decision under the Human Rights Act 1998 in the family law context 
has at least required the law to treat same and different sex cohabitants 
essentially the same.  To do otherwise is to breach the right to private and 
family life and to non-discrimination protected by Articles 8 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 
UKHL 30). 
Broadly, married or civil partners are governed by a family law framework 
which has developed to protect the more economically vulnerable family 
members – children and spouses (most typically wives) who reduce their 
earning capacity as a consequence of fulfilling the home-making and child-
caring functions within the relationship, leaving the breadwinning or most of it 
to their partner.7  Informal cohabitants, whilst able to claim financial support 
for the benefit of any children of the relationship (Child Support Act 1991, 
Schedule 1 Children Act 1989), have no right to any financial provision 
themselves and are governed by property law where any claim requires proof 
of shared ownership of a family asset such as the family home to establish a 
constructive trust.8  In the light of this, it is worrying that the nationally 
representative British Social Attitudes Survey in 20009 established that 56 per 
cent of people in general and 59 per cent of different-sex cohabitants in 
particular believed couples who had lived together for some time had a 
common law marriage giving them the same legal rights as married couples 
(Barlow et al, 2001).  Whilst census data reveals very low levels of self-
declared same-sex cohabitants10, 35 per cent of men and women aged 
between 16 and 59 are in heterosexual cohabitation relationships and 25 per 
cent of all children are born into cohabitation relationships (Office for National 
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Statistics, 2005, Table 5.3, Office for National Statistics, 2005a,).  In contrast, 
in 2001 the numbers marrying reached their lowest ebb since records began 
in 1897 and have risen only very marginally since (Office for National 
Statistics, 2005).  Having funded an awareness campaign (The Living 
Together Campaign) to try and advise cohabiting couples of their true legal 
position and the (often complex) legal steps open to them (see 
http://www.advicenow.org.uk/livingtogether), the government has referred the 
legal issues surrounding cohabitation on relationship breakdown and death to 
the Law Commission to consider reform (http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/192.htm) 
and their report is awaited in 2007. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of legal treatment of property in couple 
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maintained by 





can be redistributed 
between partners 
under family law to 
achieve ‘fairness’ and 
takes account of both 
financial and non-
financial contributions 
to the welfare of the 
family.  Any 
departure from an 
equal division must 
be justified 
 
Have right to claim 
maintenance from 
partner 
Where no will is 
made, partner 
automatically 
inherits all or (where 
there are children) 
part of the deceased 
partner’s estate. 
Where a will 
unfavourable to 
partner is made, 
court has discretion 
to award a divorce-
like settlement 
 
No inheritance tax 














Have no legal 
right to be 
maintained by 
partner or to 
pension 
allowance 
No family law 
redistribution 
between partners.  
Property law applies 
and redistribution can 
usually only occur 
where a financial 
contribution to 
purchase has been 
made by both 
partners or there is 
an agreement. 
 
Have no right to claim 
maintenance from 
partner 
Where there is no 
will, partner has no 
automatic 
inheritance rights.  
They can apply to 
the court but award 
is limited to 
‘reasonable 
maintenance’ and is 
far less generous 
than a divorce-like 
settlement 
 




4.1 Financial position during the relationship 
Currently, during any intimate couple relationship, each partner owns their 
own property unless they have specifically purchased it jointly.  However, the 
law also divides ownership into legal ownership – which identifies the person 
in whose name property is bought; and equitable or beneficial ownership – 
which comprises all those legal and non-legal owners who contributed to the 
purchase or who commonly intended to share ownership (see further Law 
Commission, 2002, Barlow and Lind, 1999).  Practical arrangements 
employed by couples often mean that the person in whose name property 
was legally purchased is not the sole beneficial owner because another has 
say contributed to its purchase or carried out improvements to it and the 
courts can make declarations as to the beneficial ownership of assets in 
dispute using trust law doctrines.  However, ‘merely’ looking after children of 
the family and/or playing the role of homemaker for the benefit of your legal 
owner partner will not be sufficient to found a shared interest in the ownership 
of the property (Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1991] 1 AC 107, Burns v Burns [1984] 
1 All ER 244, Law Commission, 2002, 2006).  During marriage and civil 
partnership and at all stages of an informal cohabitation relationship (including 
relationship breakdown), disputes about beneficial ownership are governed by 
complex and shifting trust law and only those who can prove to the 
satisfaction of the court that a constructive or resulting trust has arisen will be 
declared to share ownership and have a beneficial interest in the property. 
Income during relationships also belongs to the person who earns it although 
there are duties on spouses and civil partners to maintain each other and 
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these can be enforced (s 27 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, para. 39 to 
Schedule 5 Schedule Civil Partnership Act 2004).  This however is not the 
case for those who cohabit informally despite the fact that for the purpose of 
assessing eligibility for means tested benefits and tax credits legislation 
assumes cohabiting couples maintain each other (s 137 Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992).  Conversely, for the purpose of 
contributory benefits such as pensions, those who are married or are civil 
partners can, unlike informally cohabiting couples, claim an allowance in 
respect of their partners.   
Similarly, whilst the law gives rights of occupation to a spouse or civil partner 
in the family home owned (or rented) by a partner (Family Law Act 1996 s 30), 
this is not the case for same or different-sex cohabitants. 
4.3 Financial Position on Relationship breakdown 
On relationship breakdown the court both under divorce legislation and now 
the civil partnership legislation has a wide range of orders at its disposal 
including orders for periodical maintenance for a partner which adjusts income 
distribution and also lump sum orders, property transfer orders, pension 
sharing orders and settlement of property orders which adjust capital assets 
as between the parties.  These are enforced with a power to order sale of an 
asset in the case of recalcitrance (see Part II MCA 1973 and Schedule 5 Civil 
Partnership Act 2004).  Orders are awarded under the court’s discretion to 
redistribute assets between the partners in accordance with statutory criteria 
(s25 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and para. 21 to Schedule 5 Civil 
Partnership Act 2004) with an overriding aim to achieve ‘fairness’.11  The 
criteria include all the circumstances of the case, the standard of living during 
 15 
the marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, the parties’ 
respective current and future income and assets, needs and resources as well 
as financial and (critically) non-financial contributions made and likely to be 
made to the welfare of the family by each of the parties and conduct it would 
be inequitable to ignore.  The welfare of the children is the court’s first 
consideration. 
Thus in stark contrast to cohabiting couples, on divorce or dissolution of a civil 
partnership family assets may be redistributed whether or not there are minor 
children, and largely regardless of the original ownership of assets.  Indeed, 
recent developments in the case law governing financial provision on divorce 
have served to widen the gulf between married and cohabiting couples on 
relationship breakdown.  On divorce (and presumably now on dissolution of 
civil partnership), the division of assets between spouses – until quite recently 
limited to meeting only the ‘reasonable requirements’ of the weaker economic 
spouse (see Dart v Dart [1996] 2 FLR 286) - must now be measured against a 
‘yardstick of equality’ where there has been a long marriage and the assets 
available exceed the parties’ needs.  Provided there is no ‘stellar’ contribution 
by one party to the marriage, an equal division of the assets should then be 
made and non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family such as 
caring for children are of equal weight to financial contributions.12  More 
recently, they have confirmed that the weaker economic spouse should be 
compensated for what was termed ‘relationship-generated disadvantage’.13  
As Lord Nicholls indicated in White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 at 605 
‘If, in their different spheres, each contributed equally to the family then in 
principle it matters not which of them earned the money and built up the 
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assets.  There should be no bias in favour of the money earner as against 
the home-maker and the child-carer’.  
This is a clear attempt by the House of Lords to strike a blow for gender 
equality and acknowledge the different but in their view equal roles played 
within family life.  Their approach is addressing the reality of the situation of 
many women but can be critcised for doing this in a way which reinforces the 
patriarchal financial dependence of women childcarers upon breadwinning 
men (see e.g. Diduck, 2001). 
Where there is no such surplus of assets or where the marriage has been 
relatively short, this is likely to justify a departure from equal division and the 
housing needs of the parties and especially those of the parent caring for any 
minor children should be met first.14 Thus a divorcing home-maker spouse 
where the major assets including the home are in the name of the other 
spouse will usually receive at least half of the assets, whereas an equivalent 
home-maker cohabitant in a similar position must prove an interest under a 
constructive trust to retain any share of the home.  This as Valerie Burns in 
Burns v Burns15 found to her cost, is often a difficult and always an 
unpredictable prospect for the economically weaker cohabitant.  Following an 
inconclusive Law Commission project looking at how to amend trust law to 
serve ‘homesharers’ including cohabitants better (Law Commission, 2002), 
the Law Commission are currently consulting on proposals to compensate 
cohabitants for economic disadvantage suffered on relationship breakdown or 
death where, as noted in Table 1 above, cohabitants have inferior claims 
against their deceased partner’s estate as compared with spouses (Law 
Commission, 2006). 
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England has chosen a presumptive approach to regulating informal 
cohabitation outside marriage or civil partnership, but as has been seen the 
legal treatment of this group is far from cohesive and is often complex and 
confusing for the growing number of couples it affects. 
 
5.  Lessons from Europe? 
With the exception of Sweden, few presumptive rights are extended to 
informal cohabitants in Europe.  However, in jurisdictions where there is a 
community of property regime this has generally been extended to registered 
partners (Boele-Woelki and Fuchs, 2003).   
Even leaving aside Britain and Ireland, the effects of marriage and registered 
partnerships on money and property still vary considerably from on European 
state to another.  Given the interests of the European Commission in 
harmonising family property law across the European Union, an empirical 
study funded by the Nuffield Foundation was undertaken to find out more 
about how community of property regimes operate in practice in the married 
and registered partnership context and to explore whether it would be 
appropriate for a community of property regime to be introduced in England 
and Wales either for married couples and, if so, in what form; and/or for 
unmarried cohabitants and, if so, in what form?16 
The first stage of the research which is fully reported elsewhere (Cooke et al, 
2006) involved a series of semi-structured interviews with 60 family law 
notaries and lawyers in France, The Netherlands and Sweden, selected for 
their specialisation either in matrimonial regime advice or divorce law. 
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5.1  The European research 
These three jurisdictions were chosen as they broadly represent the range of 
community systems in Europe and each has different approaches to 
cohabitants.  The Netherlands operates a full immediate community system, 
embracing all assets whether acquired before or after the marriage or 
registered partnership (both of which are open to same- and different-sex 
couples), and thus subject to contracting out, all assets, effectively become 
jointly owned.  However, there is no legislation in place to offering 
presumptive financial protection during or after an informal cohabitation 
relationship. The overall impression gained from notaries and family lawyers 
in The Netherlands was one of broad satisfaction with the system, and of a 
feeling that its all-embracing nature has the tremendous advantage of 
simplicity. The sharing of post-marriage debt was viewed as an acceptable 
quid pro quo for the sharing of assets.  The position of informal cohabitants 
was acknowledged to be unprotected but considered justifiable where both 
marriage and partnership registration was available to all. 
 
France on the other hand operates a different form of immediate community 
on marriage, embracing only after-acquired property.  In the registered 
partnership context, France has not extended a form of marriage to same-sex 
couples.  Rather its Pacte Civile de Solidarité (PaCS) allows same- and 
different-sex cohabitants to register an agreement in which they can agree 
their own property ownership, although in default of declaring anything 
different, a form of equal joint ownership (indivision) will be imposed.  The 
French PaCS is interesting in that it is available to same- and different-sex 
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cohabitants and is not a marriage-mirror model form of partnership.  In this 
regard stands unique (see Barlow, 2004, Probert and Barlow, 2000).  Once 
again, what is available to unmarried couples is mainly achieved through 
registration.  Although it is possible to make a declaration that a couple are 
cohabiting without registering a PaCS, this has little legal effect as there is 
hardly any presumptive legislation. In France we gained a rather more 
negative view of the practicalities of community of property from our sample of 
notaries and lawyers. In particular, while post-marriage debt-sharing was a 
fully accepted part of the immediate community regime, people in general 
were reported to be unaware of the need to take advice about opting-out of 
the default regime in appropriate situations. 
 
Sweden, though, in common with the other Scandinavian jurisdictions, offers 
deferred community, and it is not possible to contract into an immediate 
regime.  Only on divorce or death does the equal sharing of community assets 
take effect and there is provision in short marriages of less than five years to 
depart from equal division where it appears unjust to the owner of the majority 
of assets.17  In the cohabitation context, Sweden alone operates a limited form 
of presumptive (as opposed to opt-in) deferred community, extending only to 
the family home, for unregistered cohabitants.18 Here the highest level of 
perceived client satisfaction among lawyers was found, although the position 
of informal cohabitants was acknowledged to be no more than a safety-net. 
 
In considering the suitability of an immediate community of property regime 
for England and Wales, it was concluded from this first phase of the study that 
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the automatic sharing of debt under such a system was unlikely to be 
appropriate and there might well be an ideological problem with an immediate 
community system. Whilst its original rationale was to protect women, by 
giving them an automatic share in the family’s wealth to compensate for their 
inability to feather the nest because they were sitting on it, this sits uneasily 
nowadays with the independence of women.  This has led Scandinavian 
jurisdictions to move to deferred community systems.  
The Swedish system of deferred community of property on the other hand had 
perhaps more resonance with the English system, already described as a 
judicially created system of deferred community of property (Cretney, 2003). 
and perhaps even more apt after the recent suggested distinction between 
‘matrimonial assets’ automatically shared on divorce and ‘non-matrimonial 
assets’ which are less likely to be redistributed on divorce (see Miller v Miller; 
McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 ).  Sweden’s presumptive approach 
to the protection of cohabitants was also thought to chime with our own 
presumptive if chaotic approach in this field. 
 
5.2 England and Wales Study 
These issues were probed in the second phase of our study, involving 75 
interviews with a purposive sample of men and women drawn in equal 
measure from our three study areas Reading, Swansea and Liverpool.  These 
represented high-cost, mid-range and low-cost housing markets in England 
and Wales as it was felt that the value of the family home and the ability to 
rehouse both partners following divorce may affect people’s views.  Whilst this 
was not a nationally representative sample, the sample was selected to reflect 
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a whole spectrum of respondents balanced between different socio-economic 
groups, age, gender, relationship status/experience in order to access a wide 
range of views.  Using a “grounded theory”,19 approach we were interested in 
particular in how our respondents considered financial matters ought to be 
regulated on divorce. 
Views relating to the desirability or otherwise of immediate and deferred 
community of property and of automatic joint ownership of the family home for 
married and cohabiting partners were tested mainly using vignettes focused 
on first a married couple and then a cohabiting couple with some direct 
attitudinal questions where this seemed appropriate.  In order to find out what 
triggered the respondents’ views, they were asked to consider the same 
vignettes first where the couples had no children and then where children 
were involved. 
5.2.1  Immediate community 
This was tested in the married context alone as it is not a practical option for 
informal cohabitants as compared with registered partners as it would be 
impossible to pinpoint with clarity when the community came into effect. 
We used vignettes in order to probe the idea of sharing liability and then of 
automatic joint ownership of the family home, looking at a married couple, 
Rosie and Jim, and a pair of cohabitants, Bob and Wendy.   
We set the scene as follows: 
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Rosie and Jim/ Wendy and Bob have been married/cohabiting for seven 
years. Jim and Rosie/Bob and Wendy both work full-time. They live in a house 
which Jim/Bob bought before they were married/lived together; he has paid all 
the mortgage instalments and pays some of the utility bills.  Rosie/Wendy 
earns significantly less than Jim/Bob but pays for their joint holidays, her 
clothes and some of the utility bills. The house is an average three bedroom 
semi-detached house and the mortgage amounts to two thirds of its value. 
They each have a separate bank account for their earnings. 
 
And asked them to consider different events which have different outcomes in 
community of property and separate property jurisdictions during the 
relationship: 
i. Rosie and Jim/Wendy and Bob pay their salaries into separate 
bank accounts (in their own names?); they speak of “your 
money” and “my money, and sometimes of “our money”. Do you 
think the law should automatically assume that because they are 
married their earnings belong to both of them and that during the 
marriage each of them has an equal share of all the family’s 
earnings? 
ii. Jim/Bob wants to sell the house.  As the law stands here, he can 
do so without Rosie/Wendy’s knowledge or consent. What do 
you think about this?  (Explain your thinking) (If yes, What if 
Rosie/Wendy died before Jim/Bob, should she be able to leave 
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her share of the home to anyone she chose in her will or just to 
Jim/Bob?) 
 
iii. Should the law automatically make Jim/Bob share ownership of 
the house with Rosie/Wendy on their marriage/because they 
have lived together for a number of years? (Explain your 
thinking)  
iv. Jim/Bob’s hobby is sailing. He recently bought a boat worth 
£40,000. He has not paid for it, and the supplier of the boat is 
suing him.  Do you think that the supplier should be able to 
seize(take charge of) any of the following to satisfy the debt?  
 
 The house 
 Jim/Bob’s earnings 
 Both the house and Jim/Bob’s earnings 
 Rosie/Wendy’s earnings 
(Explain your thinking) 
 
v. Unfortunately the marriage/relationship breaks down and they decide 
to get divorced/live apart.  What should happen to their home? (Given 
options here as prompt, Jim/Bob should keep it and Rosie/Wendy gets 
nothing, house is sold and the proceeds divided -  equally, or most to 
Jim/Bob and some to Rosie/Wendy or most to Rosie/Wendy some to 
Jim/Bob and ask why do you think this way?) 
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 We first looked at identical situations in which Jim/Bob contracted a large 
debt for the purchase of a yacht. We asked our interviewees whether or not 
his creditors should be able to satisfy the debt using the whole of the equity of 
the shared family home which was jointly owned and whether or not they 
should be able to access his wife’s earnings.  
 
Where the scenario couples had no children, only, thirteen of the 73 
respondents who answered this question thought that Rosie’s earnings should 
be available to Jim’s creditors, as they would in an immediate community 
system. Just four of our respondents thought that Wendy, the cohabitant, 
should share Bob’s debt; all those respondents were married or divorced. No 
cohabitant (or former cohabitant) respondents thought Wendy should share 
Bob’s debt. 
There was therefore a clear rejection of the liability consequences of an 
immediate community system.  We then went on to consider views on 
automatic joint ownership of the home along the lines suggested by the Law 
Commission in 1978 (Law Commission, 1978). 
  
5.2.2  Automatic joint ownership 
We found support, in a small rather than an overwhelming majority, for the 
idea in the abstract that marriage should entail automatic joint ownership of 
property with 50 agreeing but 21 of whom had conditions or reservations such 
as the non-owning spouse making a contribution, or relating to the length of 
the marriage   A very similar majority (49 to 22) was in favour of automatic 
joint ownership of earnings, and a smaller one (45 to 28 with some qualified 
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agreement) in favour of automatic joint ownership of the family home. Views 
were evenly divided as to whether or not an inheritance should be 
automatically (that is, by law rather than by choice) shared with one’s spouse. 
 
Responses to the matching scenario for cohabitants revealed a different 
pattern. A smaller majority was in favour of the automatic sharing of earnings 
(36 to 34); and a majority (43 to 29) was against the automatic joint ownership 
of the shared home.  Interestingly, there was some unprompted suggestion by 
a few respondents that over time, cohabitants could ‘earn’ a share in each 
other’s property, but this was not explored systematically. 
 
A majority of those who were initially against shared ownership changed their 
view when asked, in the abstract, whether or not their views would differ if the 
couple had children. Most said yes and of those who were opposed to 
automatic joint ownership in general terms, only 8 did not change their view. 
In doing so, most seemed to refer to the family home rather than to earnings, 
and many gave one or both of two reasons for their change of view. One 
common reason was in order to safeguard a home for the children; and the 
other was to ensure that the children would eventually inherit some or all of 
the family home. However, neither of these is actually particularly relevant in 
assessing whether or not automatic joint ownership is an appropriate reform 
of English law. Keeping a roof over the children’s heads is achieved in English 
law by other means;20 and its commitment to freedom of testamentary 
disposition makes safe-guarding inheritance for children a matter of individual 
choice.  Added to this are the practical difficulties allied to our conveyancing 
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and Land Registration system that make it very difficult to effectively introduce 
legal joint ownership at the point of marriage or civil partnership registration 
without some great technological advances in successfully joining up 
computerised public record systems.  As for cohabitants, this would pose 
even greater problems as there is no point at which a cohabitation status 
becomes formally recognised and could thus trigger registration of joint legal 
ownership.  Automatic beneficial joint ownership is a possibility but would only 
protect an interest in the proceeds of sale of the home against third parties, 
not in the bricks and mortar.  Thus it would not actually give the protection that 
members of the public might suppose and would shroud home ownership in 
uncertainty, a matter likely to be viewed negatively by mortgagees and other 
interested third parties if not by the parties themselves.  On balance, it was 
felt that whilst it would have been a very useful reform in the 1960s or 1970s, 
it is not one where the gains outweigh the drawbacks at this moment in time.  
Would deferred community of property be more attractive? 
5.2.3  Deferred community 
First, a general question was about a deferred redistribution of assets for 
cohabiting couples.  Later vignettes were developed to involve divorce and 
cohabitation breakdown, asking respondents for views on whether or not 
family assets should at that point be divided equally between the parties as is 
the norm under a deferred community of property regime. 
 
A general question was really aimed at testing views on the Swedish system 
which uniquely imposes deferred community of specified property on 
cohabitants.  The Swedish law aims to protect unregistered cohabitants where 
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no cohabitation contract has been made.  It applies to the joint home and 
household goods acquired after the relationship for all cohabitants. We asked 
In some countries, when couples have lived together for a number of 
years, for example three, and then split up, the law pools their property 
and shares it between them. 
 
a) What do you think about this and why? 
b) If you think this is a good idea, what sort of shares do you think would 
be appropriate and why? 
 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, a majority of our respondents (38 of the 73 answering 
this question) thought this was a good idea; 19 of them suggested an 
automatic equal division of the pooled assets on relationship breakdown 
regardless of whether there were children.  A theme which came through the 
answers was that this was appropriate if both partners were working and were 
contributing to the couple’s shared life.  As one respondent expressed it: 
 
“50/50, yes it's a partnership isn’t it?  It can’t be attributed to simply 
judging what you’re putting into it.  It's a relationship that has many 
assets, not just financial.” (AR49 married male 31 – 40) 
A number of respondents (7) were sure that this system was appropriate 
where there were children but were more equivocal in other cases and others 
(a further 8), whilst certain that assets should be shared, were unsure of the 
appropriateness of equal division which they felt would depend on the merits 
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of each case.  Of the remainder broadly in favour (4), some felt that only the 
home should be shared or that inherited assets or assets acquired before the 
relationship should be excluded.  
 
However, a significant minority (32) rejected outright such a system on the 
basis that it was inappropriate, open to abuse by “gold-diggers” and unfair in 
the short-term cohabitation context where there were no children.  Here the 
overwhelming view was that financial contribution should directly govern the 
post-relationship outcome.   
 
Thus there seems to be some support for community of property for informal 
cohabitants and this is strongest where the relationship is a joint enterprise, a 
matter which may not be easy to judge.  However there was also a keen 
awareness of the possibility of abuse of such a system, which is perhaps an 
argument in favour or retaining court discretion but extending it to cohabitation 
breakdown. 
Deferred community of property was further explored by developing the 
vignettes for the married and unmarried couples (Rosie and Jim and Wendy 
and Bob respectively) who had each been together for seven years.  We 
asked what the outcome should be with regard to the family home owned by 
Jim/Bob if the relationship broke down, first where the couple had no children, 
and second where they had two children aged 6 and 4 and we specified four 
options reflecting possible legal outcomes: 
In the married context where there were no children, just under half (34) 
thought that the house should be sold and the proceeds divided equally in line 
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with the idea of deferred community of property.  Interestingly, though, even 
though this was a marriage, 37 thought the home should be divided according 
to contribution.  Not surprisingly, in the cohabitation context deferred 
community of the home or even a lesser share in it for Wendy was less 
popular. Although over half the sample were in favour of the same treatment 
of Rosie and Wendy, whatever their views were on that, over a quarter (20) of 
the respondents who felt that Rosie should get some sort of share of the 
home thought Wendy wasn’t entitled to anything at all because she was not 
married.   
 
“Because to my mind marriage is a partnership.  When you’re co-
habiting, although it is a partnership, there is still something missing, a 
certificate to show that you are married.  It’s just the way I feel about it.” 
11PL,Female, Married, 51-60, Retired, Liverpool, C2 
 
“Well Bob had the home.  It was his home before Wendy moved in.  I 
know I’m repeating myself here but there’s no legal binding with them.  
I’m a strong believer that people should get married because it stops 
one of the partners from walking away any time they want.” 21PL, 
Male, Married. 51-60 , Liverpool, C2, Car Engineer 
Thus whilst deferred community was thought more appropriate in the 
marriage context than the cohabitation context, views were divergent about 
the extent to which marriage itself should trigger an equal division.   
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However, in exploring views where our couples had children, a marked 
consensus in favour of deferred community with an equal sharing of assets 
was identified.  Our analysis here points towards three clear findings: 
 
o First there is undoubted support in principle for a deferred community 
approach, with an equal sharing of the equity of the home being 
favoured in the vast majority of cases in both the married and 
cohabitation scenarios where there are children. 
 
o Second, regardless of the preferred outcome there is little support for 
treating cohabitants differently to married couples, where there are 
children.  Indeed, only 10 of our 75 respondents gave different views 
relating to the outcomes for Rosie and Jim (the married couple) 
compared with the cohabiting Wendy and Bob.  
 
o Third, there was a reassuring near-consensus that the provision of a 
home for the children and their carer should take precedence over all 
other considerations.  In some cases, this led to a challenge of the 
orthodoxy in the jurisprudence that children should not be given a 
share of the equity of the home. 
This typifies the responses: 
 
“I think she should be allowed to stay in the house  
until the children are older and then the property sold. 
Q: And in what sort of shares? 
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A: Again, I think it should be an equal split. 
Q: And why do you feel that? 
A: Because she’s had the major responsibility of bringing up the 
children. 
Q: Now what if it was Wendy and Bob, the co-habiting couple whose  
relationship breaks down?  Would you feel differently if it was Wendy 
and Bob who went through that? 
A: No, no. 
Q: Why not? 
A: Because they’ve both still got the same responsibilities to each 
other and to their children.” (L23, female married 51-60) 
 
However, when we broke down the respondents into different categories, 
fewer of the divorced men and former cohabiting men were in favour of this as 
compared with other groups.  Rather, a purely contribution-based approach 
was felt more appropriate whether married or not and despite the presence of 
children, with Jim/Bob supporting the family in other ways: 
 
“The house was still Jim’s before marriage, before the children.  The 
house was his alone. If Jim wishes to pass that property over to his 
wife to live in until the children are of an age…that’s down to him and 
he’s obliged to financially reward his wife because she has to bring up 
two children to the standard he would like…[S]o the house would 
belong to him and he could pay a percentage of that per year to 
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support his children, keep his children and wife to a proper standard” 
(32AR divorced man, age 31 – 40) 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The findings from this study indicate that if it were felt appropriate by English 
policy makers, a Scandinavian-style deferred community of property regime 
where couples own their property separately during the relationship but are 
subject to a presumed equal division on relationship breakdown could be an 
acceptable way forward in the public imagination.  However, whatever option 
is chosen, these data certainly have resonance with earlier research in this 
field that there is support for a ‘functional approach’ to the legal treatment of 
both married and cohabiting partners.  Marriage as a trigger for legal rights 
had less appeal than we anticipated.  Rather the presence of children was felt 
by many to be the appropriate moment for family-style regulation of family 
property to intervene in a protective manner traditionally only extended to 
married couples.  Of course this makes perfect sense.  In an age of greater 
gender equality in the economic sphere, it is rather the presence of children 
and their effect on the formerly dual-earner couple where that effect is not 
borne equally by both partners that make protection necessary. 
Perhaps this is the solution to the age-old debate between feminists as to 
whether extension of patriarchal marriage-rights to cohabitants is ‘liberating or 
oppressive’ (Bailey-Harris, 1996, Carbone 1996 Fineman, 1995 and cf Deech, 
1996, Diduck, 2001).  Where there are no children of the family, it is perhaps 
in the main oppressive to the married, to civil partners and to cohabiting 
couples to impose the patriarchal baggage of marriage upon them and 
assume dependency of a weaker economic partner on the stronger, although 
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there are bound to be exceptions.  They should be free to make their own 
agreements and exert their autonomous choices. 
However, the presence of children does in most cases throw Kahn-Freund’s 
vision of economic family reality back into the frame with the need to operate 
an economic joint enterprise either exclusively or alongside economic 
individual enterprises of the adult partners.  At this point some concrete 
property rights become attractive to the partner who gives up an economic life 
of their own in favour of child care, and where decision-making about family 
finances become something less than autonomous.  It also provides a clear 
point at which any community of property regime is triggered. 
The retention of choice for those wishing to opt-out and agree a different 
economic settlement is another important element to include and perhaps 
some judicial discretion for cases of manifest injustice for those without 
children could also be retained alongside the new clear framework.  Diversity 
in living arrangements perhaps demands a plurality of responses, but perhaps 
some useful themes are emerging from this and other research. 
There is still some blue-sky thinking to be done by the Law Commission and 
the European Commission before family law can properly adapt to 21st 
century family diversity but it is hoped that in framing new legal norms, the 
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